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Christians in late antiquity did much of their best debating in their opponents’ 
absence. As a mode of polemical argumentation, imaginary dialogue is ubiquitous in 
late-antique Christian literature. Disputants were prone to reinvent rivals in the texts 
they wrote against them.1 The refutation of heretical opponents entailed imagining 
(and deviously mischaracterising) their views, before delivering a response. Virtual 
dialogue was thus the essential mode of polemical exegesis: he/they say this (which is 
wrong); in response, I/we say that (which is right). This dialogue could be performed: 
in sermons, virtuosic preachers conjured religious deviants and acted out their 
refutation, voicing both their own role and that of their opponents.2 Even ‘real’ face-
to-face debates could proceed in a similar manner. When Christians had the 
opportunity (or misfortune) to meet their opponents in person, they tended to debate 
not so much with that actual Christian as the heretical image of him they had 
constructed. This was both because of the agonistic character of such encounters, and 
because it was the most direct means to assimilate that opponent to available 
categories of heresy.3 
 
Virtual dialogue was even prevalent as a literary genre. From the second century at 
the latest, Christians wrote two-handers with religious opponents; anti-heretical 
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dialogues proliferate in late antiquity. 4  An impressive roll-call of prominent 
churchmen wrote polemical dialogues with fictitious Christian debaters: Jerome, 
Rufinus of Aquileia, Cyril of Alexandria, Nestorius, Theodoret of Cyrrhus. These 
heresiological texts make an important contribution to recent debates on the 
possibilities of dialogue in early Christianity. The repeated recourse of late-antique 
Christian writers to virtual dialogue as both genre and argumentative praxis implies a 
need to revisit the view—advanced in the introduction to an important recent volume 
edited by Simon Goldhill—that ‘early Christianity appears to have little time for 
dialogue’.5 The particular proliferation of these texts also seems to cut against the 
argument—made by Richard Lim in a series of influential studies—that fifth-century 
developments in the institutional culture of the church rendered dialogue 
unattractive for Christians, both as a social activity and a literary form.6 Lim is surely 
right that Christians found open-ended dialogue ideologically fraught because it sat 
awkwardly with their claims to possess a single religious truth. Nevertheless, the 
production of heresiological dialogues in that very century by controversialists like 
Nestorius, Cyril and Theodoret suggests that the growing use of patristic citations and 
florilegia still left space for creative literary dialogue. 
 
As Averil Cameron and Peter Van Nuffelen have persuasively argued, rather than 
seeing the rise of the church as causing ‘the end of dialogue in antiquity’, it is better 
to see it as provoking the development of new, culturally contingent forms of 
dialogue.7 This article will explore one of those forms: the imaginary heresiological 
debates in which numerous ecclesiastical controversialists involved their Christian 
opponents. It seeks to account for the prevalence of this particular form in contexts of 
Christian controversy, in spite of a patristic culture which would seem, at first glance, 
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to preclude such creative invention. These texts developed their own tropes, and 
show clear links to the ways in which dialogue was used in various other forms of 
Christian writing and speech acts. It is my contention that they are worthy of study as 
a genre in their own right. 
 
Dialogues with heresy 
Imaginary polemical dialogues took many different forms. Sometimes, writers simply 
cut and pasted the text of a rival, adding their own commentary by way of response, 
chapter-by-chapter or line-by-line.8 More often, they invented the interlocutors’ 
speech. They set out these conversations like the minutes of a debate encounter or 
church council (‘X said this’; ‘Y said that’). Authors show varying inventiveness in 
setting the scene for these fictive debates. Some used a simple framework with stock 
characters: many of Cyril of Alexandria’s dialogues take place between ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
(representing the bishop and a presbyter, Hermias); likewise, the discussions in the 
Pseudo-Athanasian dialogues against the Anomoians and Macedonians involve 
‘Orthodox’, ‘Anomoian’ and ‘Macedonian’.9 The discussions in the most basic texts 
often simply represented a series of statements and responses with little syntactic 
connection. In this way, such dialogues shade off into the contemporary genre of 
question-and-answer literature (erotapokriseis) which has received numerous excellent 
recent studies.10 
 
Others dressed up their debates with far more elaborate scenarios. They chose 
individuals who resonated as symbolic representatives of particular versions of 
Christian teaching. Literary dialogues paired historic champions of specific orthodox 
doctrines with the heretics they had incorrigibly denounced: Athanasius and Arius; 
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Augustine and his opponents; Cyril and Nestorius.11 Authors also invented characters 
as foils for their orthodox protagonists. They used judge characters who observed 
protocol and laid down judgements.12 Books were framed as individual ‘days’ of 
debate: towards the end of a section, the competitors comment on their weariness, 
the fading light and their resolve to resume the next day.13 These debaters even use 
the insults hurled on such occasions, accusing one another of blasphemy, timewasting 
and irrelevance.14 The setting of these dialogues may not have been as congenial as a 
symposiastic dinner party, but it was equally self-conscious: the sense of tone this 
(generally more bracing) atmosphere provided was just as crucial. Whatever the 
(frequent) authorial protestations to the contrary, heresiological dialogue was no less 
literary than any other form of ancient dialogue. 
 
These dialogues have tended to be neglected, in part, because of the perception that 
they are doubly divorced from ‘real’ debate and dialogue. They are seen as poor 
relations both to genuine public disputations between Christians, their co-religionists 
and religious rivals, and to the ancient philosophical texts which better suit modern 
conceptions of what dialogue is, or should be. They were certainly not dialogic in the 
modern—or classical Greek—sense in which Lim deploys that adjective.15 They did not 
present open-ended discussion between multiple parties whose differing views were 
accepted as legitimate in their expression. At the same time, as the excellent papers in 
The End of Dialogue in Antiquity suggest, the extent to which classical philosophical 
dialogues were ‘open’ or ‘closed’ varied from text to text and even individual texts 
could be envisioned as ‘oscillating between the two poles’.16 Heresiological dialogues 
were closer to the ‘closed’ end of that spectrum than most, but the difference between 
those Christian works and the more dogmatic symposia was one of degree. Moreover, 
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works like the Phaedrus, Hortensius and Saturnalia inevitably fail the other demand 
most frequently made of ‘real’ dialogue. They were not the stenographic records of 
genuine conversations; nor, indeed, were they co-written by their protagonists. As a 
result, they were the product, not of a plurality of voices, but a single author’s 
imagination.17 On those terms, all such authored dialogues were monologic, insofar as 
the reader heard only one voice which ventriloquised those of others.18 
  
It does not seem helpful to measure these texts against an external (and perhaps 
unattainable) standard of ‘real’ dialogue—a project rendered all the more difficult by 
the overlapping and conflicting meanings the word possesses.19 At the same time, the 
contrast between literary dialogues and the records of genuine disputations is not 
entirely false. The writing of a fictitious controversial dialogue had distinct 
implications, which the rest of this article will investigate. This is not to detach these 
texts from the broader historiographical question of how and why Christians did 
dialogue in the post-classical world. On the contrary, it is an attempt better to 
understand the privileged perspective these texts offer. Such literary creations show 
how Christian writers and their imagined audiences thought dialogue between 
Christians was supposed to go, or at least how, regrettably, they expected it would. 
Just as the real conversations of erudite symposiasts had been mimicked and modelled 
by philosophically-minded authors in classical antiquity,20 so Christian writers in late 
antiquity wrote dialogues which both reflected and helped to create a distinctive 
culture of controversial religious debate. Far from symbolising the end of dialogue in 
antiquity, these texts helped to perpetuate it. 
 
Dialogue and communication 
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As a literary form, dialogue was far from incompatible with the quest for uniformity 
often cited as a cause for its (perceived) early Christian neglect. The prefaces and 
contents of heresiological dialogues show their authors intended them as 
contributions towards the resolution of ‘real’ controversial debates. In the preface to 
his Dialogue Against the Arians, Sabellians and Photinians, Vigilius, a late fifth-century 
African Nicene cleric (and later bishop of Thapsa in the province of Byzacena) laid out 
a representative set of justifications. 
 
When I was taking a great deal of time discussing the true faith with myself, 
and I was seeking from consideration of Scripture how I might refute the 
numerous questions of the heretics with a brief response, (…) it appeared 
useful and greatly fitting that I might introduce the character of each heretic 
with his own professed doctrines, as if they were discussing with one another 
in person. And lest the arguments of each of them might cause doubt with no-
one examining them, I have made a certain judge, by the name of Probus, to 
carry out the office of judicial authority. Through his commendable 
discernment regarding each of them, the intention of pious depravity may be 
brought to naught. Therefore I have introduced Sabellius, Photinus, Arius and, 
for our party, Athanasius, so that the truth, refined by the greatest contest of 
combatants, might reach the notice of all...21 
 
In considering why late-antique Christian writers used dialogue, Vigilius’ repeated 
emphasis on distinction and discernment seems telling. The capacity of dialogue to 
bring clarity to doctrinal debates was a frequent authorial justification.22 Personifying 
orthodoxy and different heresies as two or more Christians debating with one another 
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enabled Vigilius and others to distinguish and classify different strands of Christian 
thought, a set of strategies central to Christian heresiology and identity formation.23 
Recent perceptive investigations have elucidated how clerics delineated the 
boundaries of correct Christianity and thus sought to define (their) Christians as a 
social group. 24  In its personification of Christian error, heresiological dialogue 
contributed to that process. In fact, Vigilius’ express intention in writing a dialogue 
was the grand design of bringing ‘the truth… to the notice of all’.  
 
Vigilius’ expansive intended audience suggests that, contrary to what might be 
expected of a genre which had represented a ‘boutique literary form’ in antiquity (to 
quote Richard Lim),25 contemporaries thought dialogue could be adapted for the mass 
communication which the Christian message required. Writers showed a self-
conscious devotion to a wider readership, often using the classic early Christian 
contrast between their simple speech for ordinary people and the elitist complexities 
of dialectic.26 In the prologue to his dialogue Eranistes, Theodoret, the mid-fifth 
century bishop of Cyrrhus in Syria, stated that he had deliberately adapted the 
formatting from earlier Greek dialogues to make it easier to tell who was speaking.27 
No sweeping statement can be made on how far dialogue writers honoured such 
commitments. Whatever their desires for brevity and clarity—and concerns about 
readers losing patience28—it is hard to escape the sense that they sometimes indulged 
in shows of Christian erudition. Vigilius’ ‘brief response’ takes up sixty columns of the 
Patrologia Latina. At the very least, the frequency with which Christians engaged 
imagined heretics in dialogue for the benefit of their audiences should caution against 
seeing this literary form as detached. Most notably, virtual dialogue was a recurrent 
feature of late-antique sermons, as Christian preachers sought to convey crucial 
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differences between their true faith and the views of heretics.29 The role that such 
dialogue played in the most basic (and arduous) of a bishop’s pastoral duties, 
preaching, suggests that dialogue could not simply be a luxury item.30 Christian clerics 
also had to offer it off the peg. 
 
The dialogue form served a clear didactic purpose for late-antique churchmen and 
exegetes. Like contemporary question-and-answer texts, heresiological dialogues 
modelled the answers which readers could give to heretical questions and theological 
conundrums.31 They went further, seeking to persuade readers of the rectitude of 
their teachings, by staging the refutation of alternative views. As Richard Lim has 
nicely suggested for Augustine’s (genuine) debates with Manichaeans, the mere fact of 
the bishop’s victory and the existence of the notarized minutes which recorded it 
could bolster his congregation, whether or not they understood his arguments.32 The 
same could be said for texts written in the style of those set-piece confrontations. 
  
For readers who paid closer attention, the malleability of imaginary debates 
permitted precise statements of similarity and difference. Most writers were 
primarily concerned to put forward their own doctrines and show how they both 
differed from and could defeat alternative arguments. At the same time, they also 
emphasized shared teachings; some even sought to demonstrate that ‘heretical’ views 
could prove aspects of orthodox doctrine. 33  Representatives of competing 
Christological and Trinitarian positions frequently drew on the same body of thought; 
the cause of their hostilities tended to reside in fine semantic distinctions. To 
distinguish orthodoxy from heresy often meant first showing what aspects of an 
opponent’s teachings could be accepted, so that the unwary neither allowed 
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themselves to be persuaded by their similarity to orthodox views, nor rejected them 
out of a misguided scepticism (thus falling into an opposite error). So, Theodoret’s 
dialogue begins with cordial discussion between his antagonists over increasingly 
complicated questions of Christian belief, before they finally reach subjects which 
divide them.34 This seemingly sympathetic approach to a competing viewpoint was 
not about open-endedness or a desire (as in Cicero’s academic dialogues) to leave the 
reader to judge. The dialogue form nevertheless provided added value: the use of an 
additional persona made precision easier for Theodoret than in a univocal doctrinal 
tractate. The flexibility of the dialogue form allowed subtle heresiological claims to be 
made. 
 
One further (if generally unstated) advantage which might reasonably be deduced is 
quite simply the opportunity to invent. In contrast to a real public encounter or even 
a written response to a theological treatise, the writing of a dialogue provided 
considerable latitude to authors to characterize controversial debates as they 
understood them and wished others to perceive them. Of course, the critical, even 
hostile readership heresiological dialogues could receive meant that their writers 
could not have things all their own way. Christian authors had to take into account 
the likelihood that they would be read by other clerics involved in contemporary 
ecclesiastical controversy. The vagaries of ancient methods of ‘publication’ did not 
allow writers close control over their texts’ circulation.35 Dialogues could find their 
way to individuals less than sympathetic to their authors’ doctrinal standpoint or 
personal integrity; they could even be read by those whom they were intended to 
attack. Certain authors at least paid lip service to the desirability of this result, 
articulating a wish to help their victims. Theodoret explained his purpose as ‘to 
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debate with them [sc. his opponents] a little, both for the sake of curing them and by 
way of concern for those who are healthy’.36 The sometimes rather blunt use of 
abusive heresiological terminology within these dialogues might suggest that they 
would not have gone down well with those who did not share the author’s 
confessional leanings. Whether or not he wished those Christians to be persuaded by 
his text, he certainly had to consider the consequences if they read it. 
 
The efforts of dialogue authors to cater for such varied constituencies drew on the 
same basic persuasive techniques. As Yves-Michel Perrin has convincingly argued, 
heresiological polemic inhered in the process of teaching Christians about correct 
doctrine and practice.37 It thus does not seem helpful, at least when speaking in 
general terms, to separate the purposes of these dialogues (or late-antique 
heresiological writings more broadly) into particular categories like teaching or 
controversy, apologetic or polemic, or the targeting of in- or out-group members.38 In 
any case, these categories were not always clear-cut in the heat of ecclesiastical 
controversy, where alliances were often fragile and disputes could arise between 
individuals who might otherwise have perceived each other as members of the same 
church. The potentially heterogeneous audience of these heresiological dialogues has 
important consequences for how they should be read. Dialogue authors like Vigilius 
and Theodoret had to try to satisfy the requirements of both their most erudite 
colleagues and their humblest congregants. They also had to proof themselves against 
a wide spectrum of opinion, from the most sympathetic of their supporters to the 
most hostile of their rivals. The literariness of their dialogues gave them leeway; it did 
not give them a free hand. 
 
 11 
Speaking in character 
In the early 370s, an Antiochene presbyter, Diodore (later bishop of Tarsus), sent two 
versions of a (now lost) heresiological dialogue for Basil of Caesarea to peruse.39 In his 
response, Basil stated his preference for the simplicity of the second text, which kept 
to theological issues, over the first, which involved polemical exchanges between the 
participants. His concerns about this personal abuse were both ethical and practical. 
While Basil did not rule out its efficacy, if directed against ‘some personage whom all 
proclaim has a presumptuous temperament (τι πᾶσι προκεκηρυγμένον ἐπὶ αὐθαδείᾳ 
τρόπου πρόσωπον)’, he stopped far short of wholehearted approval. He thought it 
better, in dialogues whose subject matter was ‘general’ (ἀόριστον), to avoid ad 
hominem digressions which disrupted the flow. For Basil, delving into the character of 
the participants was both distracting and morally questionable. 
 
If appropriate characterisation had always been a key feature of classical dialogue,40 it 
gained an additional urgency in the context of Christian controversy. The ethical 
dimension of Basil’s anxiety was a necessary consideration: dialogue writers often 
needed to refute contemporaries they perceived as erring. Yet this posed a ticklish 
problem: how to rebuke publicly another member of a community whose inter-
personal relations were supposed to be governed by love and charity.41 If the tone of 
that rebuke was not appropriately modulated, there was a danger that the author 
himself could appear as the contentious (and thus potentially deviant) party. In the 
prologue to the Dialogue of Atticus and Critobulus (generally known by a misleading 
modern title, the Dialogue against the Pelagians), Jerome caustically complained about 
the reputation his refutation of named opponents had brought him.42 Recalling 
brushes with Helvidius, Jovinian, Rufinus and Palladius, Jerome rebutted accusations 
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that his attacks had been motivated by a hate-fuelled envy (inuidia). The 
uncomfortably aggressive texts Jerome listed were not dialogues; Christian polemic in 
all genres struggled to correct fellow Christians appropriately. Nevertheless, dialogue 
increased this difficulty; indeed, Jerome’s prefatory retrospective was explicitly 
designed to forestall such allegations in the case of the Dialogue. Writing in other 
genres, Christian authors more emollient than Jerome could remain decidedly vague 
about the proponents of errant views; in a dialogue, a character had to articulate 
them. It might be suggested that the introduction of the individual personalities who 
championed particular views was a much more lively (and potentially much more 
efficacious) means to articulate Christian doctrine than carefully couched passive 
constructions. Jerome’s pre-emptive response and Basil’s critical appraisal suggest 
that not all would have taken that view. 
 
The problems with naming names did not end with concerns about literary practice 
and communal behaviour. An indignant response from early sixth-century Africa 
shows the obvious problem the explicit involvement of a contemporary posed. In his 
(now fragmentary) ten-book response to a (now lost) dialogue written by a rival 
named Fabianus, Fulgentius of Ruspe bemoaned, ‘I neither said nor thought those 
things which you saw fit to put under my name in fake minutes.’43 By inventing 
speech under Fulgentius’ name, Fabianus laid himself open to an easy retort in an 
argumentative culture which prized accurate verbatim citation. Even authors who 
were more conscientious in their quotation practices could draw accusations of 
dishonesty from the opponents whose works they expurgated. Such texts created the 
appearance of a face-to-face exchange which had never taken place. It turned a 
response into a two-way conversation, without offering the involuntary interlocutor 
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the right of reply he would have received. Few took kindly to this methodology; most, 
like Fulgentius, sought to set record straight, in a manner which threatened the 
efficacy of the text and the literary authority of its writer.44  The inclusion of 
individuals who could, in reality, answer back required artful stage management. 
 
As a consequence, authors more often than not hid their real targets (none too subtly) 
behind invented or historical heretical characters. Such a tactic had obvious 
advantages beyond plausible deniability. It gave writers leeway to depart from the 
intended sense of their opponents’ views. They could make their opponents’ stand-ins 
articulate the logical consequences of those views as perceived by the unsympathetic 
author, and thus elide them with the content of pre-existent heresies. In Eranistes and 
the Book of Heracleides, Theodoret and Nestorius constructed heretical interlocutors 
(Eranistes and Sophronius) whose views combined multiple errors. In Theodoret’s 
case, this even informed the name of his dupe: ‘Eranistes’, the ‘collector’ or ‘beggar’.45 
Nonetheless, central to the doctrines that both Sophronius and Eranistes espoused 
were the views of Cyril of Alexandria and his followers, which were thus associated 
with a plethora of other heresies, including Apollinarianism, Arianism and 
Manichaeism.46 Learned readers would spot the contemporaries who inspired these 
heretical shape-shifters. At the same time, those opponents could not complain 
without drawing attention to the awkward doctrinal similarities the dialogue had 
identified. Bringing them out into the open would do much of the author’s work for 
him. 
 
For similar reasons, Christian writers rarely appeared as themselves. The 
protagonist’s inevitable victory had the potential to seem self-aggrandising. In the 
 14 
preface to the Dialogue of Atticus and Critobulus, Jerome laid out his precautions. ‘So that 
all may assent that I do not hate men, but their errors, and do not seek to defame 
anyone… I have employed the names Atticus and Critobulus, through whom I might 
explain what both our party and that of our opponents think’.47 Other writers took 
similar steps to avoid criticism: as noted above, numerous dialogues involved an 
individual called ‘Orthodox’ and one who personified either heresy in general or a 
specific error. Earlier in his career, Jerome had himself written a Debate between the 
Luciferian and the Orthodox starring the (fictitious) ‘Helladius the Luciferian’ and 
‘Orthodox’;48 Theodoret’s avatar in Eranistes also bore that name.49 Dialogue writers 
also orchestrated debates between totemic historical figures. By using symbolic 
characters, they took a step back from contemporary ecclesiastical politics. 
 
These alternatives had the advantage of signalling a greater humility on the part of 
the author than a straightforward self-portrayal as a champion of orthodoxy. 
Nonetheless, in their own way they invoked perhaps even greater claims. When 
Vigilius of Thapsa (for example) put his own doctrines in the mouth of ‘Athanasius’, 
he suggested that he could accurately represent the words of that church father; he 
effectively set himself up as a new Athanasius. Jerome in his Debate between the 
Luciferian and the Orthodox and Theodoret in his Eranistes were similarly self-
aggrandising: in attributing their own positions to individuals called ‘Orthodox’, they 
portrayed themselves as representing a pure form of Christian thought that all right-
minded individuals should follow. In these dialogues, even when studiously absent, 




Late-antique dialogue authors shared Basil of Caesarea’s concern about deploying 
particular personalities. Yet they do not seem to have agreed with Basil’s evaluation 
of the effects of making character central to the discussions they invented. Writers 
used the tone of the conversations and the dynamics of the relationship between the 
participants to make arguments about particular teachings and those who professed 
them. These conversations could also model the reader’s own responses. Far from 
being a distraction, the foregrounding of defined characters could be crucial to the 
communication of orthodoxy. 
 
As part of their didactic purpose, heresiological dialogues could offer exemplary 
accounts of Christian education. The exchanges between the protagonists could be 
construed as those of a teacher and pupil: a setup which makes some less 
sophisticated dialogues resemble erotapokriseis, with ‘Question’ and ‘Answer’ simply 
personified. Cyril of Alexandria’s Dialogues present harmonious discussions between 
Cyril (‘A’) and his presbyter Hermias (‘B’); the recipients of their heresiological attacks 
remain off-stage. 50  The inquiring but supportive statements which ‘B’ makes 
throughout seem to identify him as a proxy for the (ideal) reader. Other dialogue 
writers decided to portray more antagonistic relationships: an understandable choice, 
especially when one party was characterized as orthodox and the other, heretical. 
Within these more polarized dialogues, there were still means to include the audience 
in the action. In Vigilius of Thapsa’s Dialogue, the pointedly named judge, Probus, 
stood in for the reader. As Patrizia Guidi has rightly noted, Probus presents himself at 
the beginning of the text as a catechumen seeking the participants’ instruction.51 
Through consideration of their arguments, the judge gains increasingly sophisticated 
knowledge of Trinitarian doctrine, until he is won over by Athanasius. Probus’ final 
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speech is both a judicial verdict and a Nicene profession of faith.52 It is difficult not to 
see in this progression a message for Vigilius’ imagined audience. They too were to 
share in the probity of his fictive judge. 
 
The interpersonal relationships on show were crucial for the writer’s ability to 
explain the status of particular strands of Christian thought and the individuals or 
groups who supported them. Vigilius’ and Theodoret’s dialogues begin with cosy 
back-slapping when the debaters discuss points of consensus, which descends into 
acrimony when they reach items of divergence.53 The plot of the dialogue could be 
used to help readers understand contemporary ecclesiastical politics. Some writers 
granted victory to the orthodox, with the submission of the heretic as his pupil. The 
result was something of a counter-factual. By acknowledging the truth of orthodoxy, 
the imagined antagonist had done what the real adherents of that particular heresy 
should (but were perhaps loath to) do. 
 
Most striking in this regard is Jerome’s Dialogue against the Luciferians where, after 
hostile opening forays, Orthodox and Helladius decide self-consciously to switch from 
polemic to the discourse of a master and student.54 Jerome seems to model not just 
how an orthodox Christian should argue with Luciferian schismatics, but also how 
those dissidents would ideally respond: by rejoining (his) Catholic Church. Helladius’ 
final statement even has this pliable schismatic explain away the likely response of 
real Luciferians. ‘You should not think that you are the only victor: we have won! The 
palm goes to both of us: you have beaten me, and I have beaten error. (…) But I confess 
one thing to you, because I know all too well the customs of my comrades: they will be 
more easily defeated than persuaded.’ 55  If Catholics were unable to convince 
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Luciferians in real debates, the audience should put this down to schismatic 
stubbornness. Sincere, but misguided Christians like Helladius could not fail to be won 
over by the arguments of those like Jerome. 
 
Other imaginary deviants remained unrepentant. Vigilius’ Arius ends his debate 
convinced of the illegitimacy of the proceedings, which had unsurprisingly ended in 
Athanasius’ victory. Arius bemoaned the ‘magical arts’ by which his opponent had 
hoodwinked the judge; he thus resolved to seek the emperor’s judgement (iudicium 
principis).56 Given the heresiarch’s reputation as an almost demonic enemy of Nicene 
orthodoxy, such recalcitrance might seem a natural choice. Yet it was not inevitable: a 
plausibly fifth-century Greek dialogue has Arius cede to Athanasius. 57  Vigilius’ 
decision to end the text in this way likely stemmed at least partly from contemporary 
ecclesiastical politics in Africa, where Homoian Christians had the support of the 
ruling Vandal kings. 58  Refusing his Athanasius (and his Nicene readers) the 
satisfaction of a humbled Arius allowed Vigilius to explain away the political support 
and ecclesiastical ascendancy of contemporaries he saw as Arians. If those Arians 
remained steadfast in their doctrinal affiliation, this was because, like the founder of 
their heresy, they were implacable in the face of its clear disproof. In this sense, the 
attribution of personalities to the protagonists facilitated endings more subtle—and 
more true to life—than a total victory for orthodox thought. Without characterisation, 
an ending which saw the heretic unconvinced would be deeply counter-intuitive and 
potentially destabilising for the imagined Catholic reader. When character was taken 
into account, the failure of dialogue to change the mind of a heretic could become as 
powerful a proof of Christian orthodoxy as success. 
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Authenticity and pseudepigraphy 
The use of revered figures like Athanasius highlights the extent to which these texts 
played to cultural notions which might be considered opposed to the whole project of 
inventing dialogue. Yet these texts were not external to the culture of patristic 
argumentation which developed in late antiquity. Nor were they simply parasitic 
upon it, even if some writers and texts came tantalisingly close to deliberate 
pseudepigraphy. The creative recasting of the teachings of past luminaries for present 
controversies was a key part of the argumentation from patristic, conciliar and 
scriptural precedents which dominated Christian debates from the early fifth century 
onwards. Expectations of adherence to strict standards of verbatim citation from 
received authorities were of course a central feature; clerics did not hesitate to accuse 
opponents of deviation from these agreed norms. Nevertheless, the mere act of 
exegesis gave invented speech an equally important role in the formation of Christian 
orthodoxy and literary culture in late antiquity.59 As Thomas Graumann (in particular) 
has cogently argued, the development of a canon of fathers simply created new topics 
for dispute. 60  Thus, the exegetical practices of selection, interpretation and 
commentary inevitably produced new doctrines, even as those who employed them 
vigorously affirmed their faithful reproduction of received tradition. Similarly, in 
paraphrasing and creating the words of Athanasius or Augustine, heresiological 
dialogues both reflected and contributed to a Christian culture for which such 
patristic reinvention was fundamental. 
 
The creative invention of speech such dialogue required allowed writers to remould 
the patristic past to suit the present.  Through careful elaboration upon the doctrines 
these church fathers had professed, authors lent new developments the imprimatur 
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of received authorities. Vigilius had his Athanasius attack numerous Arian enemies 
whose activities post-dated the bishop of Alexandria’s death (c. 373), one of whom was 
Vigilius’ contemporary.61 The topics Vigilius’ Athanasius discussed and the arguments 
he presented were in line with contemporary African Nicene Trinitarian thought. 
Through the invented speech of the dialogue, these doctrines received the reflected 
glow of the bishop’s formidable reputation. 
 
In the original version of his dialogue, Vigilius of Thapsa was careful to signpost his 
own literary agency by the inclusion of a prologue. Not all writers were so 
conscientious. A number of fictitious late-antique Christian debate transcripts appear 
without authorial prefaces. Instead, their introductory sections seem designed to 
provide verisimilitude to what follows. They recount plausible narrative contexts, like 
individuals bumping into opponents in public or staging debates as breakout meetings 
at famous church councils.62 Vigilius’ own dialogue was reformatted in this way not 
long after the circulation of the first edition.63 Either Vigilius or another African 
Nicene cleric turned the debate into a one-on-one encounter between Athanasius and 
Arius at an invented church council called by Constantius II in Nicomedia in 338/339.64 
To effect the switch, the author of the second edition added a historical introduction 
summarising the ecclesiastical politics of the years after Nicaea. He even created a 
fictitious sacra of the emperor convoking the council, which the judge character reads 
out at the beginning of the minutes. Even without the previous version, notable 
anachronisms would have prevented modern scholars from reading this text as a 
primary source for the early Arian Controversy.65 Nonetheless, as Averil Cameron has 
noted, the plausibility of the imaginary dialogues makes it difficult to judge whether 
many ‘real’ late-antiques debates actually happened.66 Readers in late antiquity and 
 20 
the early Middle Ages may have similarly struggled. Numerous Ps.-Augustinian and 
Ps.-Athanasian dialogues circulated amongst collections of those writers’ genuine 
works. 
 
The inclusion of explanatory prologues and fictitious interlocutors prevented other 
dialogues from drawing so directly upon the clout of past luminaries (and proofed 
them against accusations of forgery). Still, whomever authors chose as avatars, 
through the formatting alone they played on the authority of verbatim transcripts. By 
aping the minutes of church councils or public disputations, they made their texts 
look like the documentation crucial to the defence of particular doctrinal viewpoints. 
The inclusion of judges, auditors, hefty doses of legalese and even, in one case, a 
judicial subscription to the veracity of the transcript encouraged the same sense of 
reassuringly legalistic proof.67 Even the texts of more scrupulous writers tended to 
slide towards greater claims to authenticity in transmission. For example, in many of 
the earliest manuscript witnesses, the ‘Orthodox’ character of the Debate between the 
Luciferian and the Orthodox is replaced by Jerome himself. Of course, this alteration was 
not so far from the author’s original intentions. Jerome had sought to make himself 
into a patristic authority by writing as ‘Orthodox’; by the tenth century his success 
meant that the dialogue was more useful if he himself were in it.68 It was the signal 
achievement of the Debate between the Luciferian and the Orthodox that Orthodox had 
become Jerome (and Jerome had become orthodox). 
 
As a result of this tendency towards pseudepigraphy, both the peculiar placement and 
the contemporary agency of such texts can easily be lost in transmission. It is 
misleading to dismiss heresiological dialogues as acts of deception perpetuated on 
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audiences too gullible to tell the real Athanasius or actual minutes from imitations. 
These texts both claimed to be patristic (or conciliar) and did not. To make clear to 
their audiences the contemporary relevance of the arguments of Athanasius or 
Augustine—and, perhaps more cynically, for the author to take credit—such writings 
could not wholly shed their literariness. The roles played by these texts within 
contemporary ecclesiastical politics and their reception by individuals known to their 
authors show that contemporary circumstances dictated their composition. Adam 
Schor has made the plausible suggestion that the publication of Theodoret’s Eranistes 
in 447 was the catalyst for his confinement to his diocese.69 Jerome’s Dialogue of Atticus 
and Critobulus had a similarly striking effect within a year of publication. Augustine 
wrote to Jerome in the summer of 416 to congratulate him: the Dialogue had 
apparently made it to imperial court at Ravenna and already begun to win over some 
of Pelagius’ sympathizers.70 It was of course doubly in Augustine’s interests to puff up 
the text’s achievements, given his own position as a prominent anti-Pelagian 
campaigner and his need to placate his fellow Catholic heavyweight after their 
previous, bruising epistolary exchanges.71 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Dialogue 
was taken seriously even by Pelagius. Having (correctly) recognized that he was the 
implicit target, Pelagius felt the need to respond and to deny awareness of the 
doctrines articulated by his doppelganger, Critobulus.72 Through this virtual Christian 
debate, Jerome had taken a stand in a real one. 
 
Conclusion 
Heresiological dialogue texts have tended to be dismissed by modern scholars as a 
poor substitute for ‘real’ debate. The proliferation of examples of the genre in late 
antiquity suggests that it should be taken far more seriously. These dialogues gave 
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Christian polemicists a means to articulate what they thought orthodoxy was, and 
clearly to distinguish it from other doctrinal positions which they perceived as 
heresy. Moreover, it gave them additional room to present their disputes as they 
themselves understood them, since they were able to characterize all of the 
antagonists themselves. These dialogues should not be taken as symptomatic of some 
closure of Christian discourse in late antiquity. In fact, they help to explain how 
controversial debates continued within a late-antique church in spite of increasingly 
elaborate appeals to earlier textual precedents and the intermittent efforts of secular 
and ecclesiastical authority figures to shut them down. 
 
Fundamental to the utility of these dialogues was the paradoxical relationship they 
entertained with patristic authority and the broader ecclesiastical culture of verbatim 
citation from scriptural and exegetical texts which perpetuated it. These dialogues 
simultaneously traded on the clout of church fathers and flouted the rules of patristic 
citation by attributing to them new words and ideas. Crucial to the justification of 
such innovation was the deep-rooted plausibility which many of these dialogues 
sought to cultivate by their use of transcript formats, judges and biting quips. This 
sense of authenticity—which the likes of Vigilius and Jerome pointedly dismissed, but 
implicitly encouraged—allowed the authors of imaginary dialogues to produce new 
patristic precedents. If the fifth century did not see the end of Christian debate, it was 
(in part) because late-antique Christians were so effective at dressing up new disputes 
as old ones. Far from being a pale reflection of the real rough-and-tumble of public 
disputation, these imaginary dialogues made meaningful contributions to crucial 
confrontations over the nature of Christian truth and the identity of the Christians 
who taught it. 
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